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Mine tailing dam bursts occur frequently with attendant implications for the environment and human 16 
populations. Institutional preparedness for such events plays an important role in their lasting impact. This 17 
study analyzes the stakeholder engagement in the newly governance framework created to recover the Doce 18 
River ecosystem following the 2015 disaster, where 34 million m3 of tailings were released, killing 19 19 
people and causing massive impacts on riverine life. Following the disaster, poorly conceived political and 20 
management decisions impeded and continue to impede the progress of ecosystem recovery. The post-event 21 
management structure shows a centralized and poorly diverse stakeholder pool. We conclude that poor 22 
governance structure, and weak law enforcement, are among the main reasons preventing the Doce River 23 
post-disaster watershed recovery. A watershed vulnerability analysis combined combining dam stability 24 
and socioeconomic data, concluding concluded that low ratings of socioeconomic performance 25 
substantially increases basin vulnerability. We recommend that the watershed committee should be fully 26 
involved  in the implementation of the program and take a central role so that the most vulnerable 27 
communities (including indigenous people) take ownership of  ecosystem recovery, including indigenous 28 
people. 29 
 30 
Keywords: tailing pond, tailing dam, impoundment failure, Doce River, mining industry, environmental policy and 31 
governance, environmental impact assessment 32 
  33 
                                                          




FUNAI - National Indian Foundation (Fundação nacional do Índio) 35 
Fundão tailing dam - Dam owned by Samarco that ruptured on the 5th of November 2015 36 
Candonga dam - one of the 4 main hydroelectric dams retaining the tailings downstream the Fundão tailing dam 37 
Samarco - Samarco Mineração S.A., mining industry co-owned by VALE and BHP Biliton 38 
BHP Billiton - BHP Billiton Brasil Ltda.; Samarco´s co-share participant  39 
VALE - Samarco´s co-share participant  40 
MMA - Ministry of the Environment (Ministério do Meio Ambiente) 41 
MME - Mining and Energy Ministry (Ministério de Minas e Energia) 42 
IBAMA - Brazilian Institute for the Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (Instituto Brasileiro do Meio 43 
Ambiente e dos Recursos Naturais renováveis) 44 
ICMbio - Biodiversity Conservation Chico Mendes Institute (Instituto Chico Mendes de Conservação e 45 
Biodiversidade) 46 
DNPM - National Department of Mineral Research (Departamento Nacional de Pesquisas Minerais) 47 
ANA - Water National Agency (Agência Nacional de Águas) 48 
SEAMA - Espírito Santo State Secretary for the Environment (Secretaria de Meio Ambiente para o Estado de Espírito 49 
Santo) 50 
SEAG - Espírito Santo State Secretary for Agriculture and Fisheries (Secretaria de Agricultura e Pesca do Estado do 51 
Espírito Santo)  52 
IEMA - Institute of Environmental and Water Resources of Espírito Santo (Instituto Estadual do Meio Ambiente e 53 
Recursos Hídricos) 54 
IDAF - Espírito Santo Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Forestry Institute (Instituto de Defesa Agropecuária e 55 
Florestal do Espírito Santo) 56 
AGERH - Espírito Santo State Agency of Water Resources (Agência Estadual de recursos Hídricos do Espírito Santo) 57 
SEMAD - Minas Gerais State Secretary for the Environment and Sustainable Development (Secretaria de Estado de 58 
Meio Ambiente e Desenvolvimento Sustentável de Minas Gerais) 59 
FEAM - State Environmental Agency of Minas Gerais (Fundação Estadual do Meio Ambiente - Minas Gerais) 60 
IGAM - Minas Gerais Water State Institute (Instituto Mineiro de Gestão das Águas) 61 
IEF - Minas Gerais Forestry State Institute (Instituto Estadual de Florestas - Minas Gerais) 62 
CPRM - Mineral Resources Research Company (Companhia de Pesquisa de Recursos Minerais) 63 
CIF - Inter-State Committee (Comitê Inter-Federativo) 64 
RENOVA Foundation - Foundation managing the new Framework Agreement 65 
MPF – Federal Prosecutors’ Office (Ministério Público Federal) 66 
  67 
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1. Introduction 68 
The mining industry has experienced several significant impoundment failures over the past 30 years 69 
(Davies et al., 2000; Davies, 2002; Rico et al., 2008) (Table 1). Tailing dam failures account for roughly 70 
75% of mining-related environmental disasters worldwide  (MMSD 2002). While there is a considerable 71 
literature on the geotechnical aspects of dam failure and on the pollution-related aspects of their impact 72 
(e.g. (Rico et al. 2008), there has been relatively little research on the role of authorities in undertaking 73 
appropriate post-disaster actions. In this paper we document and evaluate the institutional response to the 74 
2015 failure of a tailings dam in Brazil.   75 
 76 
The 83,400 km² Doce River watershed spreads over two states - Minas Gerais and Espírito Santo (Figure 77 
1). Due to its transboundary status, the Doce is administered at the Federal level by the Federal Water 78 
Agency (ANA) with regional watershed management committees. The overall land use in 2014 consisted 79 
of 72% farm land, 0.9% urban area, 6.6% husbandry and 19.2% natural area (IBGE 2016). As a tropical or 80 
sub-tropical region, it has two distinct seasons: wet summer from September to March, and dry winter from 81 
April to August. The Doce River is one of the most important on the East Brazilian coast (Oliveira et al. 82 
2012) and hosts a population of circa 3.5 million inhabitants and an extensive dam system, with about 140 83 
hydropower reservoirs of different scales (ANA, 2015). The Doce still hosts indigenous communities - the 84 
Krenak and the Pataxó. These two groups include 179 individuals and are under the tutelage of the National 85 
Indian Foundation (FUNAI).  86 
 87 
On November 5th, 2015 a tailing dam collapsed upstream of the Doce River, state of Minas Gerais, Brazil, 88 
constituting the world’s largest mining disaster in terms of volume (Table 1). The Fundão tailing dam 89 
released 34 million m³ of tailings to the Doce River watershed. This caused the disruption of the entire 90 
fluvial-marine continuum, including impacts on the local population (circa 700,000 inhabitants), domestic 91 
water supply, and irrigation. On the 21st of November 2015, tailings reached the coast of Espírito Santo 92 
leaving behind 19 human casualtiesfatalities, 14 tons of macro-fauna (mainly fishes) killed by asphyxia, 93 
1,469 ha of affected riparian vegetation, and a negative impact on over 660 km of the Doce River (IEMA 94 
2017). Subsequent studies identified ecosystem service losses of over US$ 521 million per year (Garcia et 95 
al. 2017) in the Doce River watershed. 96 
 97 
The ruptured dam was located in the mining complex known as Iron Quadrangle (Quadrilátero Ferrífero), 98 
Minas Gerais state, and is considered the largest open pit mining industry in the world (Santolin et al. 2015). 99 
Brazil produces 18% of the 2.33 billion metric tons of Fe-ore produced annually worldwide (Tuck 2015). 100 
Part of Brazil’s recent economic growth is linked to the mining industry and its export of mineral 101 
commodities (from 1.6% in 2000 to 4.0% in 2014 of GDP). Samarco, one of the mining ventures exploring 102 
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the area and owner of the ruptured dam, has an annual production capacity of more than 25 million tons of 103 
Fe-ore pellets and 1 million tonnes of Fe-concentrate. In 2014, Samarco had a revenue of US $2.6 billion 104 
in Espírito Santo (Samarco 2014), 0.3% of the 2015 Brazilian GDP according to The World Bank (World 105 
Bank 2017). Samarco’s sales revenue is equivalent to 6,4% of Espírito Santo GDP and 1,6% of the Minas 106 
Gerais GDP (Samarco 2014). Vale S.A (Vale) and BHP Billiton Brazil LTDA are national companies that 107 
focus on mining, transportation, and production of ore. The two companies share ownership of Samarco 108 
(50% each).  109 
 110 
Environmental impacts of dam failures are often more dramatic than other risks from mining (Grangeia et 111 
al. 2011; Kossoff et al. 2014), because of the quantities involved at the time of the disaster as well as the 112 
long-standing local, regional and even transboundary consequences to the economy and human well-being. 113 
Previous large-scale environmental disasters show that the post-disaster recovery can last for decades and 114 
sites will likely never return to the original state (Foley et al. 2005; Lima et al. 2016). Significant recent 115 
mining dam failures include the Merriespruit (South Africa) in 1994 (Fourie et al. 2000; Van Niekerk and 116 
Viljoen 2005) and the more recent Brumadinho tragedy (Porsani et al., 2019), among others (Table 1). In 117 
resource economy-based countries like Brazil, mining activities are a vital element for the economy. 118 
Sustainable resource exploitation should, however, be supported by well-structured environmental 119 
governance frameworks, to minimize environmental disturbance and prevent large-scale accidents 120 
(Schoenberger 2016). In the aftermath of the Doce River disaster, some suggested that fines and 121 
prosecutions could be used to finance ecosystem restoration (Meira et al. 2016), while others argued that 122 
weak official policies and poor monitoring, management and legislation would limit the degree of 123 
restoration (Nazareno and Vitule 2016). In the post-disaster period, a series of management actions were 124 
taken. The aim in this paper is to analyze the stakeholder engagement in the new governance structure 125 
created after the disaster and to propose course correctionamendments, to that may help achieve the new 126 





Figure 1 – Doce River Basin and impacted fluvial channel with mining tailings. Carmo River is identified in yellow; 130 
Candonga hydroelectric dam is circled in red. Legend: ES – Espirito Santo; MG – Minas Gerais. 131 
 132 
2. Background  133 
2.1. The Doce River disaster  134 
The Fundão tailing dam (Figure 1) started operations in 2008 and had a capacity of 60 million m³ (500 m 135 
in length and 90 m in height). The first registered dam rupture was in 2009, allegedly duewas ascribed to 136 
base drainage defects (Samarco 2008). In 2011, a second incident occurred, with the release of tailings and 137 
refuse water (see Figure 1). In 2012, the tailing dam was restructured and upgraded (IBAMA 2016a). No 138 
contingency plan was in place for the Fundão tailing dam, nor for the Doce River watershed in the event of 139 
a dam failure. 140 
 141 
The Fundão tailings dam ruptured on the 5th of November 2015. A total of 34 million m³ of mining ore 142 
tailings were released to the Doce River watershed (ANA 2015). Failure of the Fundão tailing dam affected 143 
more than 600 km of the river channel and the adjacent coastal area. 67.8 % (598.3 km) A total of 685.8 144 
km of river channel was impacted.  145 
 146 
The 2015 flash dam rupture increased the Doce River surface flow from the 114 to 810 m³/s (CPRM 2015). 147 
These tailings had a specific density of 2 t/m³. Downstream of the tailing dam, the slurry gained momentum 148 
Commented [CA1]: I’m not sure where these figures fit in.  
They aren’t part of any sentence 
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and flooded the towns of Bento Rodrigues and Paracatu de Baixo causing 19 casualties. The slurry 149 
progressed through the Carmo River and along the Doce River, annihilating 14 tons of freshwater fish, 150 
destroying 1,469 ha of land, 77 km of watercourses, and impacting protected areas and indigenous lowlands 151 
(IBAMA 2016b; IEMA 2017). Turbidity reached 33 g L
−1
 (Table 3), and sediments had enrichment factors 152 
of up to 4,000 in the case of Hg (Hatje et al. 2017), with average of 5 to the remaining trace metals (Gomes 153 
et al. 2017). After 16 days and 660 km, the slurry reached the Atlantic Ocean on November 21st, 2015. At 154 
this time, the Federal Prosecutors’ Office (MPF) encouraged locals to collect live fish and safely guard 155 
them in nearby ponds and lakes while bystanders and researchers took sediment samples. Because there 156 
was no contingency plan in place, the MPF and other authorities had difficulty in taking decisions and 157 
coordinating the disaster aftermath (Figure 2). But several measures were taken: 158 
● All marine fishery activities were banned at the coast (1500 km2 sea area) for unlimited time by 159 
federal mandate; 160 
● Freshwater fisheries were stopped in the middle and upper sections of Doce River, at the request 161 
of the state of Minas Gerais attorneys. Some communities have since officially resumed fisheries 162 
(Rodrigues 2017); 163 
● Water supply was suspended; 164 
● Risk assessment to other tailing dams was initiated (Morgenstern et al. 2016); 165 
● Samarco committed to remove 1.3 Mm³ of 10.5 Mm³ tailings retained at Candonga’s hydroelectric 166 
dam by February 2018 (Morgenstern et al. 2016) 167 
 168 
 169 
Figure 2 - A timeline following events in the upper Doce River, from the creation of Samarco (mining venture), the 170 
start of Fe-ore exploitation to the latest events regarding the ruptured tailing dam 171 
 172 
Initially, the Brazilian Federal Police undertook an investigation to assess responsibility regarding the 173 
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Fundão tailing dam disaster. A parallel investigation was instigated by the mining company and was carried 174 
out by an international law office,  concluding concluded that incidents reported since 2009 in tandem with 175 
operational issues lead to the rupture. Specifically, the failure was linked to damage to the original dam due 176 
to increased saturation; slime deposition; and concrete structural problems (Morgenstern et al., 2016). In 177 
addition, the National Department of Mineral Production (DNPM) had corresponded with the company in 178 
2013 informing them that the drainage system was insufficient and there was a lack of monitoring 179 
instruments (MPF 2016a). At this point, the Brazilian Federal Police argued that the mining company took 180 
a risk to profit and issued an arrest warrant of for 8 Samarco S/A executives.  181 
 182 
Four years after the disaster, despite criminal investigations and the environmental law enforcement the 183 
ecosystem impacts in the Doce River are still indeterminate, although the first studies on the impact have 184 
been already published (Hatje et al. 2017; Gomes et al. 2017). Presently, the 16 million m³ of refuse waste 185 
left in the tailing dam are still draining into the Doce River (Chiaretti 2017). Funds have been allocated to 186 
the recovery of the Doce River, but the act of recovery has not yet started. After rupture, 16 million m³ of 187 
refuse waste were left in the tailing dam. Today, 959 thousand m³ were removed to be treated, with 2020 188 
as the deadline for dam closure (https://www.fundacaorenova.org/dadosdareparacao/terra-e-189 
agua/#manejo). 190 
 191 
2.2. Environmental Governance in Brazil 192 
To understand the post-disaster decision-making process, it is necessary to comprehend how the Brazilian 193 
environmental governance system works. Section S2 details the main Brazilian regulatory entities and their 194 
relationships (Figure S2). At the National level the MMA, IBAMA, ICMBio, ANA have responsibility for 195 
the environment and the MME deals with energy and mineral production. The MME includes the DNPM, 196 
the entity that supervises and monitors tailing ponds. Regarding the Doce River, there are equally 197 
responsible entities at the State level: IEMA and AGERH in Espírito Santo and FEAM, IGAM and IEF in 198 
Minas Gerais. The Doce River Basin Management Committee was created in 2002, to achieve the goals set 199 
through the Integrated Water Resource Management Plan of the Doce River (PIRH-Doce). When a 200 
watershed is transboundary, management is supervised at the Federal level but implemented at 201 
regional/State level.  202 
 203 
Brazil is a resource-economy country highly dependent on commodity exports. The belief that 204 
environmental compliance hinders economy growth has prioritized mining and weakened environmental 205 
regulating agencies. Lead mainly by the public sector, environmental protection is allocated scarce financial 206 
resources or is ill-distributed among the existing bodies. Lack of transparency and communication among 207 
state, agencies, institutes, and organizations, may be the culprit for the overall current standstill e.g. (El 208 
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Bizri et al., 2016; Westra et al., 2013). In this overall context, to deal with the Doce River disaster, a new 209 
Framework Agreement was created by Samarco S/A. 210 
 211 
2.3. The new Framework Agreement 212 
The jurisdictions of environmental and water resources management systems in Brazil are separate, and the 213 
Framework Agreement was designed to overcome this divide. The new Framework Agreement combines 214 
the efforts of several stakeholders to recover the Doce River after the disaster. Samarco S/A set up this 215 
framework on March 2nd 2016 with the intent to provide recovery of environmental damage to the 216 
communities affected and prevent delays at the Federal Supreme court. Samarco S/A made then a 217 
Framework Agreement between Vale S.A (Vale), BHP Billiton Brazil LTDA, Federal Government of 218 
Brazil (IBAMA, ICMBio, ANA, DNPM, FUNAI), the States of Espírito Santo (IEMA, IDAF, AGERH) 219 
and Minas Gerais (IEF, IGAM, FEAM). A fund of up to US$6.3 billion (20 billion BRL) was setup for 220 
clean-up costs (and not US$1.1-billion as cited by Nazareno and Vitule, 2016). The Framework Agreement 221 
represents a new type of structure in the national governance paradigm, bringing members of different 222 
governmental bodies into a 3-axis structure (https://www.fundacaorenova.org/quem-faz-parte/). It is the 223 
first hybrid governance system in Brazil.  224 
 225 
The Framework Agreement consists of three new entities: a regulatory body Inter-Federative Committee 226 
(CIF) (Figure 3); an independent foundation entitled the RENOVA Foundation, and several technical 227 
boards (IBAMA 2018). The CIF has a multi-level structure, composed of members of Environmental 228 
Ministry, the Federal Government, the State of Espírito Santo, the State of Minas Gerais, Espírito Santo 229 
and Minas Gerais municipalities impacted, the Doce River Hydrograph Basin Committee and Public 230 
Defenders of the States (Figure 3) and has the authority to implement agreement acts. The Renova 231 
Foundation is established treasurer, responsible for managing the US$6.3 billion restoration fund and for 232 
developing, proposing, enabling and implementing plans, programs, and projects that tackle the above-233 
mentioned environmental priorities. The technical groups discuss and implement socio-environmental and 234 
socioeconomic programs aiming at the recovery of the impacts.  235 
 236 
Both the technical boards and the Renova Foundation respond to the CIF, in a hierarchical structure, and 237 
operate according to its ruling (https://www.fundacaorenova.org/quem-faz-parte/). Nevertheless, one major 238 
player is not involved in the Framework Agreement.  This organization, MPF, the Federal Prosecutors’ 239 
Office, is a separate administration focusing on promoting social justice and democratic rights and is the 240 
main institution with legitimacy to approve agreements and other legal protocols. MPF did not participate 241 
in the agreement, stating that “the considerations given by the MPF were not taken into account by the 242 
remaining parties of the agreement (…) resulting in partial and incomplete settings, illegitimate/illegal 243 
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procedures”.  They regard the Framework Agreement as “unconstitutional in its merits” (MPF 2016b).  244 
 245 
 246 
Figure 3 – Organogram representing the CIF and its multi-level structure. 247 
 248 
 249 
3. Methodology 250 
3.1. Stakeholder analysis 251 
A narrative-based stakeholder analysis (Brown, 2006) focuses on stories that underpin our cognitive and 252 
emotional lives as agents of memory, emotion, and meaning (Brown, 2006). To derive a narrative-based 253 
stakeholder analysis, the authors based their viewings on the experience derived from the attendance of 254 
several Inter-State Committee (CIF) meetings (January/2016 – July/2018). Stakeholders were then 255 
evaluated and ranked according to the perceived importance and influence on they inferred during these 256 
meetings and the decision-making process itself. Brown (2006) defines the importance of stakeholder 257 
groups in terms of how their livelihoods were impacted by the outcome of decision-making and their 258 
influence over the decision-making process. In this study, we used 3 criteria to grade stakeholders: (i) 259 
effective communication in the CIF meetings, considering that some stakeholders were not represented; (ii) 260 
impact of the decisions on their welfare and well-being, and (iii) their level of interest in watershed 261 
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restoration. A likert scale was then used, from 1 (low influence) to 5 (high influence), to qualitatively 262 
quantify the influence of each stakeholder on the process. If stakeholders possessed a similar grade, then 263 
they were placed close-together in the graphic (Figure 4a). Once the stakeholders were ranked, a stakeholder 264 
analysis was carried out according to Mitchell et al. (1997). Mitchell et al. (1997) identified 8 types of 265 
stakeholders according to their definitive power, legitimacy and urgency regarding the decision-making 266 
process: Dormant, Discretionary, Demanding, Dominant, Dangerous, Dependent, Definitive and the 267 
Nonstakeholder. Using the previously ranked stakeholders order, we then identified the type of each 268 
stakeholder involved in the Doce River restoration decision-making proces .  269 
 270 
3.2. Basin vulnerability 271 
A simple accumulated vulnerability index per major Brazilian basin was calculated using a dataset for 272 
tailing dam risk (DNPM 2016). Using the risk classes listed by the DNPM in combination with basin size 273 
(Table 2), we calculated the overall basin vulnerability (Table S1). The higher the vulnerability, the more 274 
likely the basin is to be impacted by a potential dam rupture. The dataset included a high number of non-275 
classified dams (Table S1). We assumed that the missing data are due to either non-supervision or lack of 276 
personnel to collect data. Regardless, we considered two scenarios for such dams: a medium risk level for 277 
the missing data (vulnerability1, Table S1) and a high-risk level (vulnerability2, Table S1). Using available 278 
socio-economic data (Table S2), vulnerability was assessed (high, medium low) depending on the relative 279 
weight of each indicator. Maximum levels for each parameter were selected within the data-series (Table 280 
S2). Population and land use data were recalculated based on watershed limits (Figure S1), since official 281 
data were given per state (IBGE 2016; IBGE 2017). Vulnerability was then calculated as a percentage of 282 
each parameter maximum value. Vulnerability for each parameter was then defined as Low (if index is 283 
between 0-0,33), Medium (0,34 a 0,66) and High (> 0,67) and averaged to reach the final watershed 284 
vulnerability (Figure 5). 285 
 286 
 287 
4. Results  288 
4.1. Stakeholder Analysis 289 
To evaluate stakeholders’ role in the new framework agreement setup, a stakeholder analysis was carried 290 
out. The stakeholder analysis was based on Brown (2006), whose approach considers relative levels of 291 
influence and the importance of classifying stakeholders according to their power, values, and interests.  292 
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  293 
Legend: 294 
Primary stakeholders Secondary Stakeholders 
1 Local communities 12 IDAF 
2 Local recreation users 13 Municípios  
3 Tourists 14 Fundação Renova 
4 Recreation fishermen 15 Samarco 
5 Professional Fishermen 16 Vale  
6 Hotel owners 17 BHP Billiton 
7 Land developers 18 MMA 
8 Industries 19 Ibama 
9 Watershed committee 20 ICMbio 
10 AGERH 21 ANA 
11 ANEEL 22 IGAM  
  23 IEF 
  24 FEAM 
  25 IEMA 
  26 DNPM 
  27 CPRM 
  28 CIF 





Figure 4 – (a) Stakeholder level of importance (Brown 2006) in relation to being impacted by the disaster and level of 297 
influence on decision-making on the post-disaster actions following the new Framework agreement and b) stakeholder 298 
typology according to (Mitchell et al. 1997) 299 
 300 
29 stakeholders were involved in the new Framework Agreement, varying in degrees of decision-making 301 
power (Figure 4a). Following Brown’s (2006) guidelines, stakeholders were categorized into primary and 302 
secondary, depending on the level of decision-making power. The upper left square of Figure 4a describes 303 
a type of stakeholder defined as Demanding by Mitchell et al. (1997), a group that has no power nor 304 
competences but is highly impacted by the decision-making process (Figure 4a). In the current case, local 305 
communities (1 in Figure 4a) and local professional fisherman (3) are considered the highest impacted 306 
stakeholders. Local communities include the local population living in the river’s vicinity, and also the 307 
indigenous people, some of whom worship the river. For these people, the Doce provides water, food, 308 
shelter and a belief system. The group most impacted and influenced by the disaster, Local communities 309 
(1) have the lowest influence in the new governance system. The local professional fishermen (3) have 310 
higher influence since they form official associations that represent their well-being and interests. Both 311 
land-developers (7) and industries (8) are considered here as small local businesses, like farmers and dairy 312 
farms. Both (7) and (8) are currently facing economic and environmental impact, in terms of degraded land 313 
and river, which are the natural resources that sustained their business. AGERH (10), ANEEL (11) and 314 
IDAF (12) (Discretionary stakeholder) are Federal and State institutions that possess both expertise and 315 
legislative power but are neither greatly impacted by the disaster nor have great influence over the decision 316 
process. These are institutions that have little to no representation at the CIF and are not currently included 317 
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in the watershed recovery program, but do have legislative power at the State level (Figure S2, Section S3). 318 
They are considered Discretionary stakeholders (Mitchell et al. 1997). Samarco (15), Vale (16) and BHP 319 
(17) are identified as Dormant stakeholders (Mitchell et al. 1997), since they have financial influence but 320 
lack urgency and legitimacy in the effective ecosystem recovery. The three mining companies are involved 321 
in the prosecution process and are responsible for providing funds to finance the Doce River recovery. 322 
Another type of stakeholder are the Dangerous type, a role regularly taken by NGOs. However, Brazil does 323 
not have NGOs with sufficient power to influence the decision process and this category is consequently 324 
absent. The Fundação Renova (14) is the sole stakeholder defined as Dominant, since it has power with 325 
legitimacy to manage the funds that were allocated to the Doce River recovery. It is worth noting that the 326 
DNPM, the institute that supervises tailing dams in Brazil, is identified as neutral in terms of impact and 327 
influence (very close to the origin in Figure 4a and Discretionary stakeholder in Figure 4b). The DNPM 328 
has all the legitimacy to sanction and stop mining exploitation prior to disaster but after the tailing dam was 329 
ruptured, the DNPM had no competency relative to ecosystem and environmental restoration.  330 
 331 
Mitchell (1997) describes the Dependent stakeholder as those who lack power but who have urgent 332 
legitimate claims because they depend upon other stakeholders for the power necessary to carry out their 333 
will. In this sense, we defined the majority of environmental agencies as dependent (Figure 4b). In the new 334 
Framework agreement, these autonomous agencies that normally have the authority to implement 335 
directives, supervise and execute sanctions are now dependent of CIF decisions. The Definitive stakeholder 336 
is a stakeholder that has all three driving attributes for effective decision-making (Mitchell et al. 1997). 337 
Here, we define CIF as the sole Definitive stakeholder in the decision process of the Doce recovery (Figure 338 
4b). Empirically, the MPF has all the three main attributes as well, but it removed itself from the Framework 339 
agreement early in the process (described in Section 4.2).  340 
 341 
Samarco (15), Vale (16) and BHP (17) are considered as powerful stakeholders because they have financial 342 
capacity and they provide the funds that will be used to recover the ecosystem. They are nonetheless 343 
Dormant stakeholders because they lack the urgency to recover the environment. This urgency might have 344 
increased in a post-disaster scenario, at the direction of the main legal authority – the MPF. However, since 345 
the MPF has removed itself from the Framework Agreement, the powerful stakeholders remain dormant.  346 
 347 
4.2. Basin Vulnerability 348 
Impacts of dam failure are mainly experienced at the local level but the activities of high-risk mining 349 
industries are supervised by a national body in Brazil – DNPM. Mining activities spread across the country 350 
with over 3000 listed tailing ponds (Table S1). Currently, there are numerous dams at risk of rupture in 351 
Brazil (Table S1) (DNPM 2016). Basin vulnerability can be calculated using tailing dams’ risk and size 352 
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(Table S1) and socioeconomic data regarding indigenous people representation, GDP and administration 353 
improbity (Table S2). According to our calculations taking particular attention basin size, and using a 354 
simple likert scale (Table 2), this analysis shows that Brazil has considerable basin resilience (Figure S1) 355 
(Lacerda et al. 2002). The watersheds with the highest vulnerability are “Costeira do Norte Oriental” and 356 
the Doce River (Figure S1). But when a social dimension is added (Table S2), many basins have increased 357 
vulnerability (Table 2). Several basins present medium vulnerability to dam rupture (Figure 5), although 358 
no basin presents high risk currently. Figure 5 shows basins vulnerability, where we can see that almost all 359 
coastal watersheds have a medium vulnerability risk. 360 
 361 
 362 
Figure 5 – Basin vulnerability based on dam risk failure assessed by DNPM (DNPM 2016), combined with the 363 
ratings attributed to basin size, and socioeconomic data according to the described in section S4.  364 
 365 
 366 
5. Discussion 367 
With a diverse and complex governance, Brazil offers a flexible environmental management system that 368 
may be considered an advantage when risks such as disasters arise. In the absence of pre-planned responses 369 
to mining tailings dambursts, this might be considered beneficial.  The Framework Agreement was a novel 370 
approach, established within this flexible system to address a specific disaster event and it set out to involve 371 




The Agreement includes members from all the main environmental federal and state agencies, with 374 
available funds for ecosystem recovery, and there is sound national and international technical expertise 375 
available. According to Hardy (Hardy 2010), this is a major positive, since effective agency-based 376 
partnerships comprise highly skilled technical experts, government officials, and representatives from 377 
regional and state agencies. As with other hybrid governance systems, this framework is a complex structure 378 
involving a multiplicity of actors and many interrelations between the ‘local’ and the ‘global’ (Muradian 379 
and Rival 2012). Partners in such governance systems tend to have common environmental issues and 380 
therefore coordinate activities and resources towards common research and development (Hardy 2010). 381 
Indeed, according to Renn et al. (2011), institutional diversity has several benefits:  382 
● Increased flow of communication across environmental agencies 383 
● Reduced bureaucracy 384 
● Expedited watershed rehabilitation, since communication and decision-making are faster 385 
● Simplified decision-making because scientific and technical information is customized 386 
● Aggregated information can be provided to the public. 387 
 388 
While the Framework agreement achieved diversity, the mining industry still has strong influence over the 389 
Renova Foundation and the overall decision-making process (Figure 4a). This is attributed to the following:  390 
i. The MPF does not participate in the agreement, i.e., the national regulatory body is not in the CIF. 391 
Therefore, the Framework Agreement does not hold judicial power to implement and regulate 392 
recovery actions. According to Eckersley (2004), management decisions regarding public and 393 
common pool goods require that higher-level institutions and organizations be recognized as 394 
legitimate. Since the highest legal Brazilian regulatory body does not partake of the agreement, 395 
any decision and resulting action are not legally binding;  396 
ii. The Framework Agreement establishes Samarco, the “polluter”, as the creator of the Renova 397 
Foundation responsible for managing the financial resources being deployed in the restoration 398 
process. This implies that the polluter has control over the decision-making process, diminishing 399 
effective institutional diversity. Similar economic influence of the private sector over the Brazilian 400 
Government is illustrated by the 2015 regulation that prohibits donations by private companies to 401 
political parties (law 13,165 of electoral reform). Before then, political campaigns were financed 402 
by private companies up to a limit of 2% of their gross annual revenue. Specifically, a company 403 
with a turnover of 2 billion USD a year may donate up to 3 million USD to a given political party. 404 
Politicians have been criticized for this practice because they were focused on companies' growth 405 
to the detriment of the protection of the population and the environment (Westra et al. 2013).  406 
 407 
The Framework agreement was conceived to expedite ecosystem recovery after the impacts of the disaster, 408 
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and 4 years after the disaster ecosystem recovery is at its early stages 409 
(https://www.fundacaorenova.org/dadosdareparacao/terra-e-agua/#manejo). And addingConsidering the 410 
above-mentioned Framework agreement weaknesses, in tandem with the challenges in achieving a 411 
balanced stakeholder representation (Figure 4a, 4b), we come to the conclusionde that the agreement in its 412 
present form is lackluster. According to Muradian and Rival (2012), solving the problems posed by loss of 413 
ecosystem services normally requires that we a move away from thinking in terms of single, ideal 414 
managerial approaches to combining governance structures, scales and tools. If the Framework Agreement 415 
is to be successful, governance must therefore move from a single center of power (McGinnis 2000). The 416 
Framework Agreement places itself between markets and hierarchies to create a hybrid governance 417 
structure, similar to the Chesapeake Bay transboundary watershed management (Just and Netanyahu 1998). 418 
In that case, policy decisions regarding restoration and protection of the Chesapeake Bay watershed have 419 
four distinctive decision-making levels: (a) consensus, (b) unilateral, (c) champion, and (d) voting 420 
(Chesapeake Bay Program, 2009; Diaz-Kope and Miller-Stevens, 2015). Similar to the Chesapeake Bay 421 
program (Chesapeake Bay Program 2009), the Framework Agreement should adopt distinctive decision-422 
making levels that guide governance activities.  423 
 424 
It is paramount for the Doce River future recovery that collaboration happens between the different layers 425 
of federal and state government, academia, industry and local communities, including indigenous people. 426 
This collaboration is implicit in the Framework Agreement but is not attained in reality because of 427 
stakeholder bias over decision-making (Figure 4b). CIF, the definitive stakeholder, and Renova Foundation, 428 
the dominant stakeholder, lead stakeholder decision-making with what may appear as economic bias, 429 
prioritizing mining over human and environmental welfare. Instead, watershed ecosystem recovery should 430 
be prioritized and concepts of ecological engineering and ecohydrology should be adopted (McClain and 431 
IAHS, 2002; Millenium Ecosystem Assessment 2005). To achieve this, we recommend the watershed 432 
committee (9) to take the central role as Definitive stakeholder. In addition, indigenous people’s interest in 433 
wetland recovery should be better represented in the process. As Muradian and Rival (2012) state, state 434 
policies are ineffective without appropriate incentives or local engagement in rule making. Indigenous 435 
people like the Krenak not only rely on the Doce River for their livelihood, but also perceive the river as a 436 
deity. Engaging them in the Doce recovery, guided by technical support, could serve as an example for 437 
indigenous rights. This would be similar to the Kagera project (http://www.fao.org/family-438 
farming/detail/en/c/449936/), a transboundary watershed between Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda 439 
supported by FAO that assign local communities’ responsibilities over protecting wetlands for water and 440 
food supply. This decentralized approach involves field work and teaching local communities.  441 
 442 
With so many sources of risk and increased basin vulnerability (Figure 5), a good system needs to be 443 
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developed to deal with tailings dam bursts. The Framework Agreement has strengths and weaknesses (as 444 
seen in the previous sub-section) but is not the perfect answer. Given the scale of mining operations in the 445 
Iron Quadrangle, monitoring, contingency plans, and legislative reinforcement need to be undertaken at the 446 
same management level. We already observed a similar disaster in Brazil recently e.g. (Oliveira et al. 2019) 447 
and they will continue to happen if action is not taken at the national level. Contingency plans are 448 
instrumental in preventing and minimizing environmental impacts along the entire fluvial-estuarine-marine 449 
continuum, and policy-making need to focus more on prevention at source (Lu et al. 2015). Forcing 450 
industries to implement contingency plans for possible dam failures now may mitigate uncertainty in the 451 
future (see Canadian Directive 085).  452 
 453 
5. Final remarks 454 
Brazil currently dismisses state participation in industrial resource exploitation. The new Framework 455 
agreement was formed to manage the Doce River post-disaster watershed recovery constitutes the first 456 
hybrid governance system in Brazil. In principle, the Framework Agreement to recover the Doce River 457 
would be diverse and well-structured but the authors found that decision-making is still centralized in the 458 
Inter-State committee (CIF) and efforts to minimize the industrial biases should be made. The authors 459 
recommend that the stakeholder watershed committee should take the central role and adopt ecological 460 
engineering and ecohydrology concepts to recover the ecosystem. Empowering the most vulnerable 461 
communities in watershed ecosystem recovery would assure collaboration between the different layers of 462 
federal and state government, academia, industry and local communities, including indigenous people. 463 
Furthermore, the socioeconomic data regarding indigenous people representation, GDP and administration 464 
improbity increases basin vulnerability. Political instability and population disbelief in government policies 465 
add to the already precarious state of the physical environment.  466 
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Table 1: Environmental effects of mine tailings and industrial wastes impoundments failures. F: fluvial; 
L: lake; R: reservoir; C: coastal 
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Table 2 – Summary of the variables considered to calculate basin vulnerability based on tailing dam risk 






















A 5 small >10.000 3 10-15 High 
B 4 medium 
10.000 - 
200.000 
2 5-10 Medium 
C 3 large 
< 
200.000 
1 0-5 Low 
D 2      
E 1      




Table 3 – Doce River list of impacts in the post-disaster and loss of environmental services. Data 
retrieved from (IEMA 2015) 




Disturbance of riverine margins  1,469 hectares; 77 km of watercourses 
Lost of riverbanks and soil along the 
river Unknown/n.d. 
Alteration of geomorphology  
changed the overall natural character of the 
river 
River  
Resuspension of airborne particulate 
matter from dry sediment at riverbank Unknown/n.d. 
River bed silting 56,6 m³ released 
Water quality decline* 
As, B, Cr, Ni, Mn, Pb, V and Zn exceed 
Conama 357 for water quality  
Sediment quality decline* 
As, Cr and Ni exceeded the norm Conama 
454 for sediment quality  
Temporary perturbation of the food web Unknown/n.d. 
Biodiversity losses 
Unknown/n.d. - 14 t of dead fish, total of 
29.292 collected specimens 
Temporary water turbidity 800.000 ntu 
Habitat alterations Unknown/n.d. 
Endemic species extinction  Unknown/n.d. 
Ocean  
(1500 km2) 
Impacts on aquatic habitat 
Turtle-nesting area (4000 births in 
2015/2016) 
Beach erosion 400 m still trying to calculate this area 
Biodiversity losses Unknown/n.d. 
Water and sediment quality decline*  
Lakes  Water and sediment quality decline*  
Social Local communities Flooding and destruction of villages 19 people dead 
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Fisheries Interruption of fishery activities  
Forbidden at the coast and until 25 m depth 
at Doce River mouth 
Tourism 
Temporary suspension of touristic 
activities   
Water supply Suspension of water supply  12 municipalities 
Economic 
Industries Interruption of industrial activities at least 16 huge companies  
Power plants 
Interruption of power generation  
Downstream hydroelectric power plants 
ceased activities to retain the tailings. 
Candonga is still closed. 
Irrigation and cattle 
breeding 
High turbidity caused damage to the 
pumping systems, distribution networks 
and water spray equipment. Water turbidity of 800.000 ntu 
* in (Hatje et al. 2017) 
 
